The role of political instability and corruption on foreign direct investment in the MENA region by Aloui, Zouhaier
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The role of political instability and
corruption on foreign direct investment
in the MENA region
Zouhaier Aloui
Faculty of Economic and Management of Sousse University of
Sousse, Tunisia
26 August 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/95732/
MPRA Paper No. 95732, posted 26 August 2019 17:15 UTC
The role of political instability and corruption on foreign direct investment in 
the MENA region 
 
                                               Zouhaier Aloui 
                                   Faculty of Economic and Management of Sousse 
                                                  University of Sousse, Tunisia 
                                                     Department of Economics 
                                                Email: Zouhaier_a@yahoo.com 
 
 
Abstract 
The interest of this paper is to show the influence of political instability and corruption on 
foreign direct investment and its different effects among MENA countries. Political instability 
and corruption are highlighted as a risk factor for the foreign investor who generates several 
costs for economic activity and remains a major determinant of FDI. The combination of 
political instability and corruption contributes to the revolution in these countries such as 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and weak economic integrations in general explain the low attractiveness 
of MENA countries for foreign investors. It is widely argued that good governance is an 
important factor of FDI. With the exception of studies of corruption, however, empirical 
research on the link between governance and FDI is limited, particularly in the context of 
MENA countries. Corruption and political instability are the governance indicators that seem 
to have the greatest impact on foreign direct investment (FDI). An increase in FDI has the 
greatest effect on development in politically stable regimes. Studies of corruption and its 
relation to foreign direct investment (FDI) have yielded mixed results; some have found that 
corruption discourages FDI, but others have found the opposite. The study covers the MENA 
region for the period 1996-2016. Using the panel data technique and the results obtained 
indicate a negative relationship between political instability and foreign direct investment and 
between corruption and FDI. 
Keywords: political instability, corruption, foreign direct investment, MENA countries. 
         1.   Introduction  
The financial crisis revived the debate about the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in economic growth in developing countries, particularly in Africa. Many economists and 
financiers agree that the current of the financial crisis can have negative effects on economic 
growth in Africa, due to the reduction of foreign capital flows. In addition, many of these 
literatures have been devoted to Africa and its regional disparities in foreign direct investment 
(FDI). 
Globalization is a controversial, complex phenomenon, a major problem is particularly at the 
macroeconomic level, for example international trade, (including bank lending, foreign direct 
investment and portfolio investment) and hand migration in the realization of globalization as 
a process. In addition, commercial enterprises, in particular transnational corporations (TNCs), 
play a key role in these mechanisms or processes. Another important aspect is that the 
phenomenon of globalization is unequal in its impact. The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) is widely regarded as the most successful region in the developing world to 
attract foreign capital flows (at least until the financial crisis and Asian Economic 1997). The 
considerable increase in FDI in developing countries over the last decade also reflects the 
improvement in the local investment environment perceived by investors, due to the adoption 
by many countries of macroeconomic and structural soundness. In the early 1990s, Asia was 
the main beneficiary of FDI, and then, after the Asian crisis, Latin America took the lead. But 
in recent years, there has been a rebound in Asia where FDI has again overtaken Latin America. 
FDI in the MENA region, on the other hand, barely increased during this period. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that MENA is the only region that can attract FDI, especially those with 
significant natural resources (oil, natural gas). Historically, MENA countries have a higher level 
of volatility associated with risk relative to developed country investment. This risk instability 
is a decisive factor in discouraging FDI in the MENA region. 
Since the early 1990s, economists have paid increasing attention to the relationship between 
institutions and economic growth. Several studies show that "good institutions" can 
encourage private investment, improve the overall efficiency of the economic system and 
significantly contribute to economic growth. Over the past year, most MENA countries have 
undergone profound economic and institutional reforms aimed at improving macroeconomic 
stability, international openness and private sector development. The signing of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership Agreements, with a gradual elimination of trade barriers, has a 
positive impact on international trade relations in the MENA region. 
In addition, recent studies by Bellos and Subasat (2012) suggest that poor governance is a 
source of attraction rather than an obstacle for multinational enterprises in countries in 
transition. Apart from democratic accountability, all other governance variables were 
negatively associated with FDI, revealing aspects of FDI such as improving poor governance. 
In these circumstances, poor governance could have a positive influence on FDI as it could 
allow companies to circumvent poorly designed regulations. An obvious way to evaluate this 
statement and estimate similar regressions for non-transition countries. FDI is an important 
source of capital, technology and skills transfer. It helps the economy, they are a source of 
benefit from market expansion, cost-cutting factors and other tariff measures. A country with 
good resources, a market with high potential and adequate infrastructure can have a good 
opportunity to attract more FDI. The eclectic paradigm (OLI) of multinationals is based on the 
theory of internalisation including local factors in several countries to help determine FDI. The 
volatility associated with investment risk is crucial in terms of foreign direct investment for 
MENA countries. 
Dunning (2000) has argued that institutional factors such as good governance and economic 
freedom are increasingly important in terms of the importance of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and the motives of multinational enterprises (MNEs). have gone from market to search 
for resources for efficiency-research. This only implies the traditional determinant of FDI such 
as natural resources, low labor costs and good infrastructure that are becoming relatively less 
important but less traditional, such as governance and freedom. increasingly important (Loree 
and Guisinger (1995)). Except corruption, the empirical investigation of the link between 
governance and FDI is limited, with some supporting documents the widely held view is that 
good governance encourages FDI (Globerman and Shapiro (2003); 2007)). 
The results of the recent empirical work of Bellos and Subasat, consider that bad governance 
is a source of attraction of FDI, not only in countries in transition, but also in MENA region? 
The purpose of this study is therefore to examine the effects of political instability and 
corruption on foreign direct investment in the MENA region, for the period 1996-2016. More 
specifically, this study aims to answer the following questions: 
1- Is political instability and corruption a source of attraction for foreign direct investment in 
the MENA region? 
This work is organized as follows: First, we present a review of the literature on the impact of 
political instability and corruption on FDI. Second, we present the evolution of FDI and 
governance indicators in MENA countries. Then we discuss empirical models and 
methodology. We describe the data and present the results of the estimation. Finally, we will 
conclude this work with a conclusion and political implications. 
          2. A review of the literature 
Relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
Jose and Ling (2015) examined the relationship between corruption and foreign direct 
investment and gave mixed results. Some have found that corruption discourages FDI, but 
others have found the opposite. Resumes previous studies in the OLI paradigm, but also seeks 
to advance our understanding of this relationship by introducing the notion of "distance of 
corruption" between pairs of countries and apply it to the particular context of Latin America. 
After controlling transaction costs and institutional variables, the results show that the 
distance of corruption has an asymmetrical impact on FDI. Countries with the distance of 
"positive" corruption compared to home country levels of host corruption, experience no 
significant increase or reductions in inward FDI levels. However, the distance of "negative" 
corruption experienced by host countries is associated with significantly lower levels of FDI 
inflow. We argue that firms in a host country with relatively low levels of corruption are not 
familiar with the formal and informal institutions associated with corruption. Conversely, 
companies in the home country with high corruption are discouraged by high corruption in 
host countries. Thus, the distance of corruption can be considered as a determining factor of 
FDI by investing in a very corrupt location. 
Eduardo; de Arce and Escribano (2014) examined the main determinants of FDI in Latin 
America during the period 1990-2010. The facts support positive influences on FDI inflows and 
trade openness, maintaining low levels of short-term debt with a balance of payments deficit, 
stable government and low risk expropriation. Countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela, where the investment framework has become relatively less stable over the 
past decade, are finding it increasingly difficult to attract foreign investors. From a risk 
management point of view, both public solutions (such as sovereign guarantees) and private 
institutions have an important role to play in reducing the uncertainty associated with foreign 
investment decisions. Freckleton, Wright, and Craigwell (2010) examine the relationship 
between direct investment, corruption, and economic growth. The results suggest that 
corruption has a significant influence on GDP per capita in the short run, but it is not significant 
in the long run. Lower levels of corruption have also been found to improve the impact of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) on development and economic growth. This has important 
implications for decision makers. 
Wei (2000) studies the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment by using panel data 
for a sample that covers the bilateral investment of 12 countries of origin and 45 host 
countries. There are two central conclusions. First, an increase in the tax rate on multinational 
companies or the level of corruption in a host country reduces foreign direct investment (FDI). 
In one estimate, an increase in the level of corruption, that of Singapore and Mexico, would 
have the same negative effect on FDI inflows as the raising of the tax rate by fifty percentage 
points. Second, US investors opposed corruption in host countries, but not necessarily more 
than average OECD investors. Egger and Winner (2005) find a positive and clear relationship 
between corruption and FDI, on a panel of 73 developed and less developed countries during 
the period 1995-1999. They showed that corruption can be A positive, positive relationship 
between FDI and corruption shows that government officials use administrative controls and 
bureaucratic discretion to profit from foreign investors. 
The relationship between political instability and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
Gouenet and Nguena (2014) examined the reflection of the effect of the business environment 
on investment, which remains the main determinant of the quality and quantity of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) destined for country. Socio-political instability creates an unfavorable 
environment and represents a risk for private investment in general and for FDI in particular. 
The attractiveness of sub-Saharan African countries for foreign investors and the coexistence 
of socio-political instability factors such as civil wars, coups and various civil problems have 
led to the use of a specific context in Cameroon to evaluate the relationship between socio-
political instability and FDI. Gouenet (2011) examines the impact of socio-political instability 
on private investment in Cameroon. Socio-political instability is highlighted as a risk factor for 
investment that generates transaction costs for economic activity. The combination of the 
economic crisis with political crises contributes to the deterioration of the business 
environment in general and explains in particular the hesitant behavior of private investment. 
The estimation in an equation of investment determinants using OLS of the previously 
calculated political instability indicator revealed a negative correlation between the 
coefficient of political instability and the evolution of private investment during the period 
1960-2002 in Cameroon. 
Rodrik (2001) shows that even moderate amounts of political uncertainty can act as a heavy 
tax on investment, and that sensitive counter-reforms can be damaging if they raise doubts 
about their performance. A simple model is developed to link political uncertainty to the 
response of private investment. Alesina, Ozler, and Swagel (1996) examined the relationship 
between political instability and economic growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 
1950-1982. We define "political instability" as the propensity for a collapse of government and 
we consider a model in which political instability and economic growth are jointly determined. 
The main result of this study is that in countries with a high propensity of falling government, 
growth is significantly lower. This effect remains strong when we limit our definition of 
"change of government" to significant changes in government. Ngbesso (2011) examines the 
impact of political risk on the net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into 31 countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa from 1984 to 2008. The results indicate a negative and significant 
relationship between political risk and FDI inflows into sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, the global 
political risk score indicator of the international Country Risk Guide is positively related to FDI 
flows. This means that any increase in political risk leads to a decrease in net inflows of FDI 
into Sub-Saharan Africa. The results of the study obtained are robust to all tests performed in 
our analysis. As pointed out by Busse and Hefeker (2007), the relationship between political 
risk, institutions and foreign direct investment has been analyzed. They find that the stability 
of government, internal and external conflicts, law and order, ethnic tensions, bureaucratic 
quality, and to a lesser degree corruption and democratic accountability are the most 
important determinants of the flows of FDI. 
Jun and Singh (1996) found an aggregate indicator of political risk based (on sub-components) 
on the value of FDI. They find that in a sample of 31 developing countries the political risk 
index is statistically significant and the coefficient implies that countries with high levels of 
political risk attract less FDI. Singh and Jun analyzed various factors, including political risk, 
business conditions, and macroeconomic variables that influenced FDI in developing 
countries. Using a common model of developing countries, they have shown that political and 
business risk have been important determinants of FDI for countries that have historically 
attracted high investment. 
Desbordes (2005) shows that global political risk and diplomatic risk influence US 
multinationals investing in developing countries. Chiara Del Bo examines the effect of the 
exchange rate and institutional instability on the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
between developed and developing countries by presenting an empirical study of a panel of 
countries over two decades , both with cross-country and cross-sectoral data, justified by a 
partial equilibrium model of the entry of foreigners. The question is first presented with a 
model of partial equilibrium of the FDI in an oligopolistic sector, or the same the foreign 
companies must decide to enter a host market characterized by the volatility of the exchange 
rates and the risk policy. The results indicate that exchange rate variability and political risk 
have a moderating effect on FDI flows, and that the interaction term is negative, indicating 
that the two effects are mutually reinforcing. Econometric analysis confirms and verifies these 
results. 
3. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Governance 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
                              Table 1- FDI flows by region, 2010-2012  
                                   (Billions of dollars and percentage) 
 
 
Traditionally, FDI flows are directed to developed countries. Between 2010 and 2012, 
developing countries received $ 637- $ 703 billion of world flow. Table 1 shows the FDI inflow 
trend in three regions: Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa. Remarkable 
differences can be noted between the three economies considered. It may be noted that FDI 
has met with significant growth in the first two economies while growth has proved to be 
much more restrained in Africa. As well as towards the emerging Asian economies, in the last 
decade, a considerable influx of FDI has been directed to Central and Eastern European 
countries. At the regional level, FDI flows to developing countries such as Asia and Latin 
America have remained at historically high levels, but their dynamics have weakened in Africa. 
For example, in 2012 FDI inflows into Asia ($ 407 billion), while FDI outflows ($ 308 billion), 
Latin America ($ 244 billion) and FDI outflows ($ 103 billion) dollars) and Africa ($ 50 billion), 
however, out of FDI ($ 14 billion). So improving foreign direct investment is a prerequisite for 
development in the MENA region. In the experience, the growth of FDI flows in the MENA 
countries has been significantly lower than in the EU or Asian countries, such as China and 
India, and in the American countries. Latin. 
Governance 
Chart 1- Evolution of governance indicators 
 
        Source: Kaufmann (2010) (the worldwide Governance Indicators) 
Chart 1 shows that bad governance in MENA. Economic, social and human development in the 
MENA region is handicapped by weaknesses in the quality of (national) public governance, an 
area in which the region is lagging behind the rest of the world. Governance is generally 
weaker in the MENA region than in the rest of the world. In general, the MENA countries 
present a limited and hesitant model of transparency, and it is no coincidence that this region 
has the least empirical data on the quality of governance. For example, in Egypt, the 
government's detailed budget is neither published in its entirety nor discussed outside 
parliament. Freedom of the press is carefully controlled and circumscribed in most countries. 
Table 2: Institutional Development in North Africa 
 
 Source : Kaufman et al (2010)  
Table 2 shows that most North African countries suffer from poor governance and political 
instability. Indeed, with a few exceptions, the region is below the global average in terms of 
government efficiency and political stability. In addition, most countries rank poorly in terms 
of corruption. 
4. Methodology and models 
In this paper, we will try to empirically investigate and evaluate the relationship between 
political instability and corruption and foreign direct investment in the MENA region over a 
period from 1996 to 2014, using panel data. and the database of the World Bank. 
According to the (DUI) dunning paradigm, there are several advantages of localization that 
characterize the MENA region such as the endowment of natural and human resources (oil 
and natural gas reserves), the size of the market and the potential, the degree of economic 
development, the degree of openness of the economy, macroeconomic stability. The benefits 
attract the IDE. The resource-rich MENA countries are Algeria and Libya, which are rich in both 
oil and natural gas reserves, and Egypt, which is rich in natural gas reserves. In addition, some 
countries in the MENA region have a large population size, which is potentially a human 
resource endowment. 
4.1. Empirical model: 
We use panel data to study the impact of political instability and corruption on FDI. The 
context of MENA countries during the period 1996-2014. We develop their model using the 
variables of political instability and corruption. We also use a number of new control variables 
in our model. Other variables can be added to the model to assess their relative impact. 
Our empirical model is developed to study the impact of political instability and corruption on 
FDI in MENA. The model takes the following  form:  
 = β0 + β1INSit+ β2CORit + β3GDPit+ β4OPENNESSit + β5INFit + β6EDUCATIONit + β7FDit  +  
 
4.2. Database and presentation of variables 
The dependent variable (endogenous variables) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI): is measured by net inflows of FDI as a% of GDP. We use FDI 
because FDI stocks are more stable. 
Explanatory variables (exogenous variables) 
Political Instability (INS): The political stability of the government, which is a political 
institutional function based on the correlation between FDI, the different national institutional 
coefficients and bilateral investment treaties. 
Corruption (COR): Corruption is a threat to FDI because it allows people to take positions of 
power through patronage rather than ability. Patronage threatens the rights of foreign 
investors because it facilitates expropriation by the government of the investment or may 
cause direct conflicts with customers and investors. 
Control variables 
To improve our empirical analysis, we also consider a set of control variables. These variables 
are: 
-Gross domestic product (GDP): it measures the rate of economic growth, The standard of 
living is defined by GDP per capita. 
- degree of openness or trade openness (OUV): it is measured by total exports and imports 
over GDP. An open economy is conducive for FDI flows. We expect a positive coefficient. 
-Inflation (INF): it is measured by the percentage change in the GDP deflator, it is the variable 
that represents macroeconomic policy. Is proxy for macroeconomic stability in the economy. 
It is measured by the inflation rate based on either the consumer price index or the GDP 
deflator. A higher inflation rate is an indicator of lower macroeconomic stability and real 
incomes. It discourages the search for markets but not necessary to search for resources. We 
expect a negative coefficient. 
-Human capital (KH): It is measured by the percentage of secondary schooling and obtained 
from the database of the World Bank. 
-the development of the financial market (CRED): it is evaluated respectively, total credit by 
private financial intermediaries in relation to GDP (it measures the financial intermediation of 
a country and market capitalization in relation to GDP). 
Table 3: Summary of measures of variables to use 
The variable Expressions  data source 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)  FDI Net inflows of FDI as% of GDP 
Gowth GDP GDP growth rate 
Financial development DF Composite index constructed by the PCA 
method 
Education Education The secondary schooling rate 
Degree of openness OPENNESS The sum of exports and imports relative to 
GDP. 
Inflation INF 
 
 Inflation rate 
Political instability 
Corruption  
INS 
COR 
Kaufmann et Kray 
     Source: done by the author 
Table 4 : Independent variables and expected signs 
      Inv. / GDP: Foreign direct investment. 
Exogenous variables  Expected sign 
Political instability (INS) negative 
Corruption (COR) negative 
Growth (PIB) Positive 
Inflation (INF) Positive/ negative 
 Degree of openness (OPENNESS) Positive 
Education (EDUCATION) Positive 
Financial development (FD) Positive 
            Source: Author's specification. 
 
4.3. Estimation technique 
The Hausman test makes it possible to arbitrate between the fixed effects model and the 
random effects model. The Hausman test leads to the preference of the random effect model 
over the fixed effect model. 
The Hausman test is a test of specification of individual effects. It is used to discriminate 
between fixed and random effects. The hypothesis tested concerns the correlation between 
the individual effects and the explanatory variables. 
4.4. Results of regressions and interpretations 
We begin by interpreting the results of the static models (fixed effect and random effect). It is 
necessary to perform the effects specification test which is the Hausman test. This test follows 
the Chi-square law with K-1 degree of freedom and it allows to choose between the fixed 
effects model and the random effects model. Fixed effects and random effects models make 
it possible to take into account the heterogeneity of the data. In case the probability of this 
test is greater than 5%, it is significant and leads to privileging the random effects model. In 
the opposite case, we retain the fixed effects. Thus, we retain in our study the model with 
random effects through the Hausman test the probability is 5% higher. Then, the random 
effects model is preliminary to the fixed effects model. 
Table 5 : Random effects model estimation results 
FDI Coef Std Err z Prob (95% Conf Interval) 
GDP .2355544 .0914234 2.58 0.010* .0563678 .414741 
EDUCATION .0371782 .0186968 1.99 0.047** .0005332 .0738231 
OPENNESS .0880226 .0250025 3.52 0.000*** .0390187 .1370265 
FD .0939907 .0151267 6.21 0.000*** .0643428 .1236385 
INF .0065126 .0191124 0.34 0.733 -.030947 .0439722 
INS -1.024447 .4413175 -2.32 0.020** -1.889413 -1594801 
COR -3.206444 .5812495 -5.52 0.000*** -4.345672 -2.067216 
Const -9.080428 1.587067 -5.72 0.000 -12.19102 -5.969833 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
For our sample, the coefficient of GDP is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Indeed, the impact of a one percentage point increase in GDP is likely to increase FDI by 0.235 
percentage points. This result is consistent with previous studies (Hejazi, 2009, Medvedev, 
2012), which confirmed that GDP attracts FDI. The human capital coefficient variable 
positively affects foreign direct investment. The impact of a one percentage point increase in 
human capital is equivalent to an increase in FDI averaging 0.037 percentage points. 
It is clear that commercial openness contributes positively to the explanation of the 
dependent variable for a 1% threshold. The estimation results clearly show that a one 
percentage point increase in opening would increase the inflow of foreign investors by 0.088 
percentage points. They stress that a high level of openness increases countries' economic 
growth. Financial development increases foreign direct investment. Our results show that 
credit positively affects FDI. This supports the assumption that an increase of one percentage 
point of credit leads to an increase in foreign investors of 0.093 percentage points. 
In addition, the political instability variable (INS) negatively influences FDI is significant at the 
5% level. The result is similar to that of Gouenet and Nguena (2014) examines the effect of 
uncertainty and instability on foreign direct investment (FDI). The literature shows that 
political instability and uncertainty can become a powerful deterrent to foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Socio-political instability creates an unfavorable environment and 
represents a risk for private investment in general and for FDI in particular. Gouenet (2011) 
examines the impact of socio-political instability on private investment in Cameroon. Socio-
political instability is highlighted as a risk factor for investment that generates transaction 
costs for economic activity. Ngbesso (2011) examines the impact of political risk on net inflows 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) into sub-Saharan African countries. The results indicate a 
negative and significant relationship between political risk and FDI inflows in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Likewise, our tests reveal a negative and significant relationship between corruption and FDI. 
This result can be explained Freckleton, Wright and Craigwell (2010) examine the relationship 
between direct investment, corruption and economic growth. The results suggest that 
corruption has a significant influence on GDP per capita in the short run, but it is not significant 
in the long run. Lower levels of corruption have also been found to improve the impact of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) on development and economic growth. 
Wei (2000) studies the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment. There are two central 
conclusions. First, an increase in the tax rate on multinational companies or the level of 
corruption in a host country reduces foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Table 6 : search results 
The Variable Planned sign  Sign found 
Political instability (INS)      -      - 
Corruption (COR)       -         - 
Growth (GDP)      +     + 
Inflation (INF)      -/+  
 (OUV)      +    + 
Capital humain (KH)       +    + 
Développement financier (CRED)      +    + 
 
Conclusion and political implication: 
FDI plays an important role in the global economy. Subsequently, understanding its 
determinants is an important part of motivating and attracting more foreign investors. In 
addition, it is important for the host country to promote and develop programs to attract FDI. 
The results indicate a negative relationship between political instability and foreign direct 
investment and between corruption and FDI. The results give some suggestions for 
policymakers to make their country more attractive for investment such as political stability 
and the absence of corruption. 
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